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E. DONALD ELLIOTT*
The law of fashion is a law of life. The crest of the wave of
human interest is always moving, and it is enough to know that
the depth was greatest in respect of a certain feature of style in
literature or music or painting a hundred years ago to be sure
that at that point it is no longer so profound. I should draw the
conclusion that artists and poets, instead of troubling them-
selves about the eternal, had better be satisfied if they can stir
the feelings of a generation, but that is not my theme. It is more
to my point to mention that what I have said about art is true
within the limits of the possible in matters of the intellect.
[OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.]'
A curious ambivalence toward the past underlies contemporary legal
thought. On one hand, through the method of precedent, the judicial
process venerates the past. Here one finds a subtle appreciation of what it
means to be part of a tradition. The past is regarded as a valuable source
of insights. Less obvious but equally important is the corollary: that learn-
ing and sense are needed to mediate between past and present. Thejudges
thought great are not those who apply blindly rules from old books. It is
understood that a living tradition implies a priesthood to reinterpret and
reinvigorate, and thus to preserve.
Legal scholarship has not, by and large, shown a similar attitude toward
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Guido Calabresi, Owen Fiss, Abe Goldstein, Jerry Mashaw. George Priest. Peter Schuck,
and Harry Wellington for their help and their encouragement. Responsibility for errors is
mine-and Holmes's.
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the work of its own past. With the exception of a handful of "classics"
that still speak to contemporary issues in the law, 2 articles in legal publi-
cations are rarely read more than a few years after they appear, except
perhaps by other legal scholars making the obligatory bow to prior work
in their area. The absence of a strong sense of its own past is a distinctive
feature of legal scholarship. Academic historians, philosophers, and liter-
ary critics cultivate a tradition. Legal scholars, imitating science, purport
to be engaged in a quest for new knowledge which, if successful, would
sweep aside the paradigms of their predecessors.
The purpose at present is not to quarrel with the dominant philosophy,
but to acknowledge that the essay which follows is an experiment with a
different approach. This is an article about an obscure and long forgotten
article by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., which appeared in the Harvard
Law Review in 1899 under the title, "Law in Science and Science in
Law." 3 In that article, Holmes implicitly developed a sophisticated
theory of how bodies of law evolve. Holmes's theory of legal evolution,
once reclaimed from obscurity, can be a valuable source of insights into
the nature of the judicial process and legal change.
The first premise for the present endeavor, then, is that the cycle of
intellectual fashion referred to in the epigraph has come full circle, so that
now may be a propitious moment to reconsider Holmes's theory of legal
evolution. The second premise is that resources worth mining in our
intellectual heritage, such as Holmes's article, do not present themselves
easily to the casual reader, but require explication and elaboration. As
intellectual concerns and languages of discourse change, ideas known to
our predecessors become obscure and lose much of their power for us. It
is fatuous to assume that this is because thinkers in the past were primi-
tive and we are advanced. Rather, we must approach the legal scholarship
of only three generations ago with something like the attitude with which
one approaches Thucydides or Ben Jonson: with an awareness that trans-
lation will be both necessary and worthwhile. Using methods like those of
the literary critic, one tries to bring the work back to life and to build on
the themes which it suggests.
This effort to rediscover "Law in Science and Science in Law" will
proceed in three sections. Each section takes the article as its center, but,
like a series of concentric circles, each successive section will put
Holmes's ideas into a broader context.
2 For example, Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of
the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
3 Holmes, supra note I.
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The first section has the narrowest focus. It begins by locating "Law in
Science and Science in Law" in Holmes's career. Next the argument of
Holmes's paper is stated. The first section concludes by relating "Law in
Science and Science in Law" to the ideas about the common law that
Holmes expressed earlier in The Common Law. The article is a more
mature, and in some ways a more sophisticated, statement of Holmes's
views about legal change, although his earlier work has attracted far
greater attention.
The second section adopts the perspective of intellectual history. The
scholarship of the past is worth studying not only for the light that it casts
on historical figures such as Holmes, but also for what it may teach us
about ourselves. A text such as "Law in Science and Science in Law" is a
fixed point which does not change as fashions in jurisprudence come and
go. By engaging the text, we may be able to bring into view the unar-
ticulated assumptions and unconscious preconceptions that our own age
brings to thinking about law.
Holmes's ideas in "Law in Science and Science in Law" have been
virtually ignored, as succeeding generations of lawyers have perceived
Holmes's thought selectively, seizing portions of it which support a view,
made fashionable by the legal realists, that judges are a subspecies of
legislator. That theme is surely in Holmes, but in works such as "Law in
Science and Science in Law," the view of the individual judge as lawgiver
is counterbalanced by a vision of the law as a system.
In the third section, we explore the portion of Holmes's theory of law
that has not been taken seriously until now, the view of law as a system
that evolves according to a logic that is separate from the will of individual
judges. Holmes's model of common-law evolution describes the law as an
information system in which the internal structure of the system is con-
tinually modified by interactions with the environment. Legal "logic"
generates hypotheses, which are tested by "experience," with the results
feeding back to modify the set of legal principles that are available as the
guiding logic for the future. Holmes's description of the common law as a
cybernetic system raises the prospect not only that the law evolves, but
that law is a form of artificial or social intelligence that is capable of
learning about the environment.
1
In 1899, when "Law in Science and Science in Law" appeared, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., was approaching his fifty-eighth birthday. He had
reached a plateau in his long legal career which must, at the time, have
appeared to be its pinnacle. An associate justice of the Supreme Judicial
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Court of Massachusetts for sixteen years, Holmes had filled his office
with diligence if not unusual public acclaim. His years of glory on the
Supreme Court of the United States lay in the future.
Outside of Massachusetts, Holmes was known to lawyers more as a
scholar than as a judge. During the 1870s, while in his early thirties,
Holmes had published a series of articles in the American Law Review, a
prominent law journal of the era, which he edited from 1870 to 1873.
Holmes would also have been known to many practicing lawyers as the
editor of the twelfth edition of Kent's Commentaries, which appeared in
1873. Holmes's fame, however, rested on a series of lectures that he had
delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1880. The lectures were
published the following year under the title The Common Law, and soon
became the most celebrated American law book of that (and perhaps of
all) time.
For an after dinner speaker at its annual meeting in January 1899, the
New York State Bar Association chose this scholar of common-law his-
tory turned state appellate judge. The article which appeared later in the
Harvard Law Review under the title "Law in Science and Science in
Law" is verbatim Holmes's address to the bar association.4 For a topic,
Holmes chose how the common law changes. This was a theme which he
had explored nearly twenty years earlier in The Common Law (which
Holmes referred to modestly, but frequently, in his speech as "a book
which I printed a good many years ago").
5
"Law in Science and Science in Law" is a significant milestone in
Holmes's thinking about the law. Holmes introduced The Common Law
with a famous aphorism: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."-6 Holmes's biographer and editor, Mark DeWolfe
Howe, has argued that there was for Holmes "a personal almost auto-
biographical significance in this pronouncement-an admission, as it
were, that his first effort in jurisprudence had been mistaken.", 7 As a
young man, under the influence of his training in philosophy at Harvard,
Holmes sought a scheme of classification that would make the law
"scientific" and "logical."- 8 A decade later, in The Common Law,
4 22 Proc. of N.Y. State Bar A. 97-124 (1899) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings].
Holmes, supra note 1, at 447.
6 Holmes, The Common Law 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963). Holmes had used the same words
previously in an unsigned review, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1880).
7 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction to Holmes, supra note 6, at xxii.
8 Id. There is certainly some truth to Howe's point. The emphasis in Holmes's work does
change, but Howe falls into the error of "discovering" a pattern that is neater than the
evidence supports. Even Holmes's first article displays a strong leitmotiv on the importance
of "experience." Holmes wrote that the common law "embodies the work of many minds,"
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Holmes saw both logic and experience at work in the law (despite his
introductory "life of the law" aphorism). In his initial lecture, Holmes
emphasized historical forces. Anticipating some of the themes that he was
to develop later in "Law in Science and Science in Law," 9 Holmes even
referred to "survivals"' 0 and "transformations"'' of legal doctrines.
However, after the first lecture, Holmes's emphasis changed. "Logic"
became more important as Holmes considered areas of the common law
one by one and sought to find, or to impose, a coherent theory on each.
Even Howe admits that The Common Lawi' is "not primarily a work of
legal history" but "an endeavor in philosophy."'1
2
In "Law in Science and Science in Law," written almost two decades
after The Common Law, Holmes the judge returns to reexamine the roles
of "logic" and "experience" in the law, an older and perhaps a wiser
man. Somewhat immodestly, Holmes declares that his present objective
is "to show the true process of law-making, and the real meaning of a
decision upon a doubtful case ..... , Holmes's topic and the occasion
were not well matched. Holmes's text is difficult, replete with long, schol-
arly disquisitions into subjects as recondite as the techniques of land
conveyancing under the fifth-century Germanic Lex Salica. One imagines
that the gentlemen of the New York bar were a bit nonplussed, a senti-
ment which may be hinted at in their resolution after Holmes's speech
acknowledging his "scholarly and comprehensive paper."'14 Yet read as
serious scholarship, Holmes's address suffers from a lack of apparent
organization, as if it were a series of disconnected musings about a miscel-
lany of legal topics with no strong thesis.
The key that unlocks Holmes's deeper meaning is to recognize the
structure that underlies his argument. "Law in Science and Science in
Law" has three main sections. In the first, Holmes describes "transfor-
mations" of ideas in the law as evidence of evolutionary change. In the
second section, Holmes identifies the "evolutionary processes" that
create change in the law. In the final section, Holmes focuses on
"pathologies" that can impede the evolution of the law, which he calls
which is an advantage which cannot be made up by "any faculty of generalization, however
brilliant." Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1870) reprinted 44
Harv. L. Rev. 725, 725 (1931).
9 Holmes, supra note 6, at I1.
0 Id. at 22.
I Id. at 24.
12 Id. at xx. Accord Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 52 (1977).
'3 Holmes, supra note I. at 455.
4 Proceedings, supra note 4, at 124.
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
"survivals" and "generalizations," and proposes a role for judges to
keep the law from stultifying.
A. Transformations
Patterns of Legal Evolution. "Law in Science and Science in Law"
begins with a brief introduction in which Holmes muses about what it
means to explain a thing, and more particularly, about the nature and uses
of the "process of historical explanation." 1 5 Holmes then focuses on "the
scientific study of the morphology and transformation of human ideas in
the law." 6 He begins with "some examples ... by way of illustration." 17
What Holmes finds noteworthy in the examples (which are drawn from
the development of the law of land conveyancing extending back to the
Salic Franks) is that a legal form gradually changes from age to age, a
process that Holmes analogizes to the evolution of biological structures:' 
8
"[lIt is the transformations which it has undergone to which I wish to call
your attention .... Surely a flower is not more unlike a leaf, or a segment
of a skull more unlike a vertebra, than the executor as we know him is
remote from his prototype, the saleman of the Salic law."
Such transformations, Holmes continues, are typical of the law: 19 "I
confess that such a development as that fills me with interest, not only for
itself, but as an illustration of what you see all through the law-the
paucity of original ideas in man, and the slow, coasting way in which he
works along from rudimentary beginnings to the complex and artificial
conceptions of civilized life." The process of legal development, Holmes
contends, is analogous to evolution in nature: 20 "It is like the niggardly
uninventiveness of nature in its other manifestations, with its few smells
or colors or types, its short list of elements, working along in the same
slow way from compound to compound until the dramatic impressiveness
of the most intricate compositions, which we call organic life, makes them
seem different in kind from the elements out of which they are made,
when set opposite to them in direct contrast." Holmes goes on to general-
ize the comparison to evolution to the "broader field of the development
of our more general legal conceptions
' 
21 such as the origin of contract: 22
15 Holmes, supra note I, at 443.
16 Id. at 445.
17 Id.
'8 Id. at 446.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 446-47.
21 Id. at 447.
22 Id.
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"We have evolution in this sphere of conscious thought and action no less
than in lower organic stages, but an evolution which must be studied in its
own field." Holmes is concerned here not with particular legal ideas, but
rather with the process by which "more general legal conceptions" or
"generalizations" such as contract are formed. He begins by attacking
the prevalent "assumption ... that there must have been some theory of
contract from the beginning, if only you can find what it was." 2 3 Instead,
Holmes argues that particulars generate the theory, as results in concrete
cases gradually coalesce: 24 -It seems to me well to remember that men
begin with no theory at all, and with no such generalization as contract.
They begin with particular cases, and even when they have generalized
they are often a long way from the final generalizations of a later time.
Down into this century consideration was described by enumeration....
and only of late years has it been reduced to the universal expression of
detriment to the promisee."
Holmes's description of the evolution of discrete legal generalizations
such as contract resembles the process by which species form in nature.
As organisms adapt to niches in the environment, separate species gradu-
ally develop.2 5 Holmes describes contract as a natural "field ' 2 6 or "em-
pire ' 27 that could have been dominated by one of several "competing
ideas." 
28
The Nineteenth-Century Meaning of Evolution. By the term "evolu-
tion" Holmes understood something different from what we do today. We
tend to understand evolution in terms of the theory of genetic mutations in
biology. Late nineteenth-century American writers such as Holmes de-
monstrably did not have genes in mind when they spoke of evolution. The
concept of genetic mutations was not even proposed in biology until 1901,
two years after Holmes wrote "Law in Science and Science in Law."-
29
Lacking population genetics, the late nineteenth-century's concept of
biological evolution was based largely on identification of patterns of
gradual change in nature. This method of naturalistic observation had
been utilized by Charles Darwin in his On the Origin of Species by Means
of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Strug-
23 Id. at 448.
24 Id.
25 For an account of the modem theory of "speciation," see Michael J. White, Modes of
Speciation (1978), esp. chs. 6-7.
26 Holmes, supra note 1, at 448.
27 Id. at 449.
28 Id.
29 See Evolution, The New Columbia Encyclopedia 909 (William H. Harris & Judith S.
Levey eds. 1975).
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glefor Life, which appeared in 1859. Holmes uses common-law history in
roughly the same way that Darwin used observations of animals and
plants in nature, as raw material to be searched for evidence of patterns of
gradual, evolutionary transformations.
However, long before Darwin's theory and compilation of supporting
naturalistic evidence, the concept of evolution had achieved currency
among philosophers, historians, astronomers, and geologists as a
metaphor for a gradual process of patterned growth.3 ° Particularly in late
nineteenth-century America, where Herbert Spencer's work generalizing
evolution to areas far afield from biology was more read than Darwin's,
31
evolution was conceived of as a universal process of gradual change in
nature rather than as a narrow analogy to mutations in biology.
Evolution, in this broad sense, was an enormously influential concept
at the turn of the century. In place of mechanical metaphors based on
Newtonian physics, evolution introduced analogies to organic growth and
probabilistic concepts such as variation and selection.32 Like Adam
Smith's market, evolution was a way of explaining that systems could be
more intelligent than the individuals who constituted them. 33 This proba-
bly helps to account for the appeal that evolutionary metaphors held for
Holmes. For Holmes, common-law evolution, based in part on a rough
analogy to Darwin's theory of natural selection, was a way of describing
the common law as a product of legal systems, as opposed to the creation
of individual judges. Evolutionary metaphors would give Holmes a means
of explaining how the common law could be wiser than the judges who
made it.34
B. Evolutionary Processes
After describing patterns of historical development and transformation
in the common law in terms of evolutionary growth, Holmes turns in the
3" See R. C. Lewontin, Darwin's Revolution, 30 The New York Review of Books 21 (June
16, 1983); Introduction to Darwinism Comes to America xii (George Daniels ed. 1968).
"1 See Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought 31-32 (rev. ed. 1959).
32 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 54-55 (1911).
testified to the influence that Darwin's ideas had on political thinking: "The government of
the United States was constructed upon the Whig theory of political dynamics, which was a
sort of unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe. In our own day.
whenever we discuss the structure or development of anything, whether in nature or in
society, we consciously or unconsciously follow Mr. Darwin: ......
" See Donald T. Campbell, Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolu-
tion, in Social Change in Developing Areas: A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory 19.
26-27 (Herbert R. Barringer, George 1. Blansten, & Raymond W. Mack eds. 1965). See also
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 18-22 (1974) (discussing appeal of "invisible
hand" explanations).
" Compare the quotation from Holmes's first, unsigned article. Codes, and the Arrange-
ment of the Law, supra note 8.
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second section of "Law in Science and Science in Law" to identifying the
mechanisms, or types of "evolutionary process, ' 3 5 that produce change
in the law. Holmes describes two separate processes, which he calls "the
struggle among ideas" and "integration." The first is based on a rough
analogy to Darwin's theory of natural selection and the second is drawn
from Herbert Spencer.
The Struggle among Ideas. Darwin's theory of natural selection had
three main components: 36 (I) variation: Darwin observed minute varia-
tions in physical characteristics among members of the same species and
postulated that these variations were inherited; (2) competition: faced
with inevitable scarcities of food and other necessities, a struggle for
survival takes place in which minute differences give some animals an
advantage; (3) reproduction: winners in the struggle for survival pass their
characteristics on to the next generation. Holmes describes three analo-
gous processes at work in the common law. Variation in legal "ideas" is
the raw material for evolution in the common law. According to Holmes,
the primary source of variation is factual differences. 37 Holmes asserts
that the common law builds from the ground up, so that available legal
ideas reflect the diversity of experience.38
Even granting Holmes's (dubious) assumption that there was once a
simpler time when "men begin with no theory at all," 39 it does not follow
that changing factual circumstances will continue to be a source of varia-
35 Holmes. supra note 1, at 450.
3' This conceptualization of the essential elements of Darwin's theory of natural selection
is based on Daniels, supra note 30, at xiii-xiv. Daniels includes a fourth element, scarcity.
However, this is a cause of the struggle for existence, rather than a separate process.
17 Professor Jan Deutsch has made a related point: "Sufficiently persuasive precedents
• . . are either voluntarily followed in the future or are applied again to situations that are
different at least in the sense that time has passed and that different parties are involved....
[lin almost all cases that reach the appellate level, there are other elements to justify the
applicability of some precedent other than that being urged by one's opponent. It is precisely
this complexity-the richness of factual detail in the judicial opinions enunciating governing
legal principles-that restricts the number of times earlier opinions must be overruled..."
Jan G. Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of Legal Process. 66 Geo. L. J.
1339. 1340 (1978).
-" Holmes, supra note I. at 448: "It seems to me well to remember that men begin with no
theory at all, and with no such generalization as contract. They begin with particular cases,
and even when they have generalized they are often a long way from the final generalizations
of a later time. Down into this century consideration was described by enumeration ... and
only of late years has it been reduced to the universal expression of detriment to the
promise. So. bailment was Bailment and nothing further until modern times. It was not
contract."
39 Id. Compare J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of Experience: Reflections on Den-
ning, Devlin, and Judicial Innovation in the British Context, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 179 (1980). for
the conventional modern account that common law originally grew out of "the expectations,
customs, practices, and morality of the times . . ." Id. at 181. It is not clear whether
Holmes's statement is meant to exclude such cultural sources of customary law.
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tion in the law after a body of legal theories does exist. It is at least
plausible that as cases presenting new combinations of facts arise they
will be analyzed in terms of existing legal theories, rather than modifying
the theories to fit the facts. Holmes himself describes the tendency for
legal rules to become integrated into larger, more coherent structures
(that is, generalizations such as contract), a trend that is the logical in-
verse of variation in legal rules.
The lack of a continuing source of variation is a substantial problem for
the common law as Holmes describes it, and much of the latter part of
"Law in Science and Science in Law" will be concerned with how to
prevent the law from stultifying.4 °
Holmes also describes a second source of variation in the common law.
He points out that error in the transmission of a legal principle from one
case to another can also introduce variation into the law. When a prece-
dent is applied correctly from one case to another, a legal idea has repro-
duced; when the legal idea is misapplied (either intentionally or uninten-
tionally), a mutant or variation has been introduced into the law. The new
legal type may or may not win out against competitors in cases in the
future. In suggesting that error can be a creative force in a legal system,
Holmes anticipates one of the latest theories of cultural evolution, which
also emphasizes the role of "copying error."-
4 1
40 See text infra at notes 78-84. The problem discussed in the text applies with particular
force in relatively unitary common-law systems such as England's (although even in that
system that was a certain amount of borrowing back and forth between courts of law and
equity). Holmes never discusses the effect that federalism and other forms of overlapping
jurisdiction may have on the speed of common-law innovation in the United States. Others
have seen that jurisdictional "redundancy" among multiple decision centers is a way of
increasing variation, and hence the rate of innovation that is possible, see Robert M. Cover.
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 639, 678 (1981). See also Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis. I J.
Legal Stud. 125 (1972); Mirjan Damaka, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 84 Yale L. J. 480 (1975) (discussing "coordinate model" of authority).
41 See L. L. Cavalli-Sforza & M. W. Feldman, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A
Quantitative Approach (1981). Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman define "culture" in terms broad
enough to include law: "those aspects of 'thought, speech, action [viz. behavior] and ar-
tifacts' which can be learned and transmitted" (id. at 10 (original brackets)). Their theory of
cultural transmission and evolution is based on the central notion of copying error, inten-
tional or unintentional. They argue that once such errors in transmission occur, the altered
cultural entity becomes a potential "model for other individuals who will transmit it" (id.).
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman then look to patterns of copying or transmission to build quan-
titative models to simulate the process of cultural evolution. Their approach has been
reviewed as having revolutionized the field, and having laid "a sound mathematical founda-
tion for the study of cultural evolution." C. Robert Cloninger, The Dynamics of Social
Learning, 213 Science 858. 858, 859 (1981). In principle, quantitative methods similar to
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's may be applicable to the study of the process of legal change,
compare Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright. Lawrence M. Friedman. & Stanton Wheeler,
The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 961. 991-94 (1978) (quantitative
analysis of citation patterns as a function of caseload).
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As in much of "Law in Science and Science in Law," Holmes's exposi-
tion of these points is by way of example; he traces the genesis of the rule
that the deaf could not make a contract as follows:
42
The Roman law held very properly that the dumb, and by extension the deaf,
could not make the contract called stipulatio because the essence of that contract
was a formal question and answer which the dumb could not utter and the deaf
could not hear. Bracton copies the Roman law and repeats the true reason, that
they could not express assent, consentire; but shows that he had missed the
meaning of stipulari by suggesting that perhaps it might be done by gestures or
writing. Fleta copied Bracton, but seemed to think that the trouble was inability to
bring the consenting mind, and whereas the Roman law explained that the rule did
not apply to one who was only hard of hearing-qui tardius exaudit-Fleta seems
to have supposed that this pointed to a difference between a man born deaf and
dumb and one who became so later in life. In Perkin's "Profitable Book," this is
improved upon by requiring that the man should be born blind, deaf, and dumb,
and then the reason is developed that "a man that is born blind, deaf, dumb can
have no understanding, so that he cannot make a gift or a grant." In a case before
Vice-Chancellor Wood good sense prevailed, and it was laid down that there is no
exception to the presumption of sanity in the case of a deaf and dumb person.
Holmes made much the same point in The Common Law when he wrote,
"Ignorance is the best of law reformers."
43
From the standpoint of introducing variation into the law, it is immate-
rial whether a copying error is intentional (as in the case of Vice-
Chancellor Wood's "good sense") or unintentional (as it appears to have
been for Fleta and Bracton). However, Holmes is rather stodgy by mod-
ern standards about judges changing the law intentionally. He cautions:
"I do not expect or think it desirable that the judges should undertake to
renovate the law. That is not their province." '
Following his discussion of variation, Holmes turns to his analogy to
natural selection, the struggle among competing legal ideas. Once varia-
tion produces two or more legal ideas that are arguably applicable,
Holmes imagines them in a competition for survival, as Darwin saw life as
a competition among animals and plants. Holmes uses the evolution of
contract law45 to illustrate his conception of the common law as analogous
to natural selection. He begins with the notion that there were a number
of different "legal ideas" that might have served as sources for a theory of
contract law: the oath, the sale, the hostage. Holmes sees "a struggle for
life among competing ideas" such that there will be an "ultimate victory
42 Holmes, supra note I, at 454 (footnotes omitted). Holmes's example is in turn drawn
from one of his early articles, Misunderstandings of the Civil Law, 6 Am. L. Rev. 37 (1871),
reprinted, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 759 (1931).
43 Holmes, supra note 6, at 64.
44 Holmes, supra note I, at 460.
45 The examples that Holmes discusses are drawn largely from Lecture VII on the history
of contract law in The Common Law, supra note 6, at 195-226.
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and survival of the strongest." 4 6 He then mixes organic and military
metaphors47 to describe the struggle among competing legal ideas for
dominion over the field of contract law:
4 8
There was a clash between the competing ideas, and just as commerce was pre-
vailing over war the children of the sale drove the child of the hostage from the
field .... But the hostage was not the only competitor for domination. The oath
also goes back as far as the history of our race. It ... might have been made to
cover the whole field of promises. . . .But oath and plighting of troth did not
survive in the secular forum except as an occasional solemnity, and I have men-
tioned them only to show a lively example of the struggle for life among competing
ideas, and of the ultimate victory and survival of the strongest. After victory the
law of covenant and debt went on, and consolidated and developed their empire in
a way that is familiar to you all, until they in their turn lost something of their
power and prestige in consequence of the rise of a new rival, Assumpsit ...
There were other seeds which dropped by the wayside in early law, and which
were germs of relations that now might be termed contractual .... I mention these
only to bring still closer home the struggle for existence between competing ideas
and forms to which I have referred. In some instances the vanquished competitor
has perished. In some it has put on the livery of its conqueror, and has become in
form and external appearance merely a case of covenant or assumpsit.
The mechanism by which the competition among legal ideas takes place
is what Holmes called elsewhere "legislative" decisions by judges.4 9
When two or more legal principles are in conflict, it is up to judges to
exercise "the sovereign prerogative of choice" by saying which of them
shall prevail. 50 Holmes does not advocate that judges follow their own
46 Holmes, supra note 1, at 449.
17 For an account of the influence that Holmes's military experiences during the Civil War
had on his view of the world, see generally Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the
Literature of the American Civil War 743-96 (1962); Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from
Within, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 437 (1965). Holmes's description of the competition among legal
ideas to gain acceptance is also similar to the marketplace of ideas metaphor which Holmes
used twenty years later in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
48 Holmes, supra note 1, at 448-50 (footnotes omitted).
41 See Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 Am. L. Rev. 608, 630-31 (1879): "[ln
substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that that [sic]
which the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its
grounds. The very considerations which the courts most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. We mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important
principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice
and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions.
but none the less traceable to public policy in the last analysis." Holmes repeats these ideas.
almost verbatim, in The Common Law, supra note 6, at 31-32.
50 Holmes, supra note 1, at 461.
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predilections in making that decision. For Holmes it is axiomatic that 5 ,
"... the justification of a law ... must be found in some help which the
law brings toward reaching a social end which the governing power of the
community has made up its mind that it wants." In ruling on a doubtful
case-one which might arguably be governed by more than one legal
principle-Holmes believes that judges must attempt to determine which
legal rule would serve the community's ends which are strongest in that
case:52 ". . . whenever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on
one side and other analogies on the other .... what really is before us is a
conflict between two social desires, each of which seeks to extend its
dominion over the case, and which cannot both have their way. The social
question is which desire is strongest at the point of conflict."
For Holmes the "more important part" of the "true science of law"
does not consist of a "theological working out of dogma or a logical
development as in mathemetics;' 53 it is rather "the establishment of [the
law's] postulates ... upon accurately measured social desires instead of
tradition."- 54 In the long run, Holmes sees progress coming through
scientific techniques to measure more accurately the relative weight of
competing social policies. In Holmes's closing vision, there is a faint
prefigurement of lawmaking by agencies armed with cost-benefit analyses
and computer simulations:
55
I have had in mind an ultimate dependence upon science because it is finally for
science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth of our different social
ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is our estimate of the proportion between
these, not often blind and unconscious, that leads us to insist upon and to enlarge
the sphere of one principle and to allow another gradually to dwindle into atrophy.
Very likely it may be that with all the help that statistics and every modern
appliance can bring us there never will be a commonwealth in which science is
everywhere supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?
Holmes has more to say later about how judges should discharge their
function in the near term, before science threatens them with obsoles-
cence. However, for the moment it is enough to note that Holmes has
I' Id. at 452.
52 Id. at 460-61.
51 Id. at 452.
54 Id.
51 Id. at 462. Cf. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)
("For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but
the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.") For a case study
describing technocratic lawmaking in action, see Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler,
Clean Coal/Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion Dollar Bail-Out for
High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done about It (1981).
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brought his description of the "struggle among competing ideas" to a
close.
Integration. Having described the struggle for life among competing
ideas as analogous to Darwinian natural selection, Holmes begins the next
section of his essay by describing "another evolutionary process which
Mr. Herbert Spencer has made familiar to us by the name of Integration"
(emphasis added).5 6
Holmes's invocation of Herbert Spencer may seem strange to the mod-
ern reader. In the decades after Holmes wrote "Law in Science and
Science in Law," the social and political theories of Social Darwinism
attributed to Spencer would be rejected and discredited.57 However, in
late nineteenth-centry America Spencer had a large popular following,
and his ideas were a strong influence on Holmes.58 When Holmes wrote
"Law in Science and Science in Law," he had not yet read Darwin, but
he had been an avid reader of Spencer as a young captain come home
from the Civil War to nurse his wounds. 59 Thereafter, the comprehensive,
56 Holmes, supra note 1, at 450.
57 The classic treatment of the rise and fall of Social Darwinism is Hofstadter, supra note
31. Some have incorrectly labeled Holmes himself a Social Darwinist, Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev.
263, 267 (1982). While Holmes did believe that legislation was the outcome of a struggle
among interest groups, as Posner suggests (id.), in the unsigned article that Posner cites,
Herbert Spencer: Legislation and Empiricism, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book
Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers 104, 107-109 (H. Shriver ed. 1936) [hereinafter
cited as Shriver], Holmes dissociated himself from the arguments against state intervention
that have come to be called Social Darwinism. For Holmes, politics was a legitimate forum
for the evolutionary struggle, and he considered it a "singular anomaly" (id. at 106) that
Herbert Spencer argued against legislation which favored one class over another. See also
Howe, Introduction, in Holmes supra note 6, at xxvi. ("The social Darwinists followed the
lead of Herbert Spencer in denying the legitimacy and wisdom of public control of private
action. In Holmes's case, however, his recognition that the common law had persistently
worked its way towards objective standards of liability brought with it ... an acknowledg-
ment that the tendency if not the progress of civilization is towards the preference of social
to private interests.") For many, the symbol of the rejection of Herbert Spencer's political
ideas in the United States is Holmes's famous line: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
" Four years before "Law in Science and Science in Law," as he was completing his
reading of Spencer's Sociology, Holmes had written to Lady Pollock: "H. Spencer you
English never quite do justice to, or at least those whom I have talked with do not .... I
doubt if any writer of English except Darwin has done so much to affect our whole way of
thinking about the universe." Letter from Holmes to Lady Pollock. July 2, 1895, 1 Holmes-
Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock
1874-1932, 57-58 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1941).
" I Mark DeWolfe Howe, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Shaping Years 1841-
1870, at 156 (1957). But see Wilson, supra note 47, at 745 (asserting, without supporting
evidence, that Holmes read Spencer while "at Harvard"). Compare Philip P. Wiener,
Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism 172 (1949) (arguing that Holmes "did not have to
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evolutionary view of the world that Holmes found in Spencer became a
"fixed element" in Holmes's thinking.
60
Although Spencer's terminology is not in general use today, many of
his ideas have become commonplaces. Spencer argued that all things are
continually in the process of either growth or decline. The constructive,
or growth, stage Spencer called "integration," while its inverse, the de-
generative process, was "disintegration. "6 According to Spencer, all
things go through a natural life cycle, characterized first by a period of
building up, or integration, followed by a period of disintegration during
which coherency is lost. 62 Similar cycles of integration and disintegration
have been noted by modern writers in many disciplines.63
True to his word, Holmes describes the evolution of tort law as an
example of Spencerian integration, the gradual building up of an orga-
nized structure: 64
read" either Darwin or Spencer for their ideas were "in the air" during his college days).
See also Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 Harv. L. Rev. 717,
722 (1931) (Darwin part of "Zeitgeist").
6 Howe, Introduction to Holmes, supra note 6. See also Robert M. Cover, The Left, the
Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 Md. L. Rev. 349, 383 and n. 118 (discussing
the influence of Spencer on Holmes's First Amendment jurisprudence).
61 Herbert Spencer, First Principles § 95 at 258 (6th ed. 1901): "All things are growing or
decaying, accumulating matter or wearing away, integrating or disintegrating.... Both the
quantity of matter contained in an aggregate, and the quantity of motion contained in it,
increase or decrease; and the increase or decrease of either is an advance towards greater
diffusion or greater concentration." Compare Jeremy Rifkin, Entropy: A New World View
(1980) (proposing a "world view" not unlike Spencer's based on the second law of ther-
modynamics).
62 Spencer, supra note 61, § 96 at 260: "... there is always a differential progress towards
either integration or disintegration. During the earlier part of the cycle of changes, the
integration predominates-there goes on what we call growth. The middle part of the cycle
is usually characterized, not by equilibrium between the integrating and disintegrating pro-
cesses, but by alternate excesses of them. And the cycle closes with a period in which the
disintegration, beginning to predominate, eventually puts a stop to integration, and after
death undoes what integration had originally done."
63 See, for example, Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 8-9 (1949):
"The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are compared.
The period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several phrases may be tried out;
the misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect. The concept sounds like
another, and the jump to the second is made. The second stage is the period when the
concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to classify items
inside and out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning
by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of the
word is no longer desired." See also Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions (1970). Compare Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-
trust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization 16 (1975) (describing a
theory attributed to George Stigler that "vertical integration will be extensive in firms in
young industries; disintegration will be observed as an industry grows; and reintegration will
occur as an industry passes into decline").
64 Holmes, supra note 1, at 450-51.
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The first stage of torts embraces little if anything beyond those simple acts of
violence . . . known as the action of trespass. But when the action on the case let
libel and slander and all the other wrongs which are known to the modern law into
the civil courts, for centuries each of the recognized torts had its special history,
its own precedents, and no one dreamed, so far as I know, that the different cases
of liability were, or ought to be, governed by the same principles throughout....
You may see the change . . . by comparing Hilliard on Torts, which proceeds by
enumeration in successive chapters through assault and battery, libel and slander,
nuisance, trespass, conversion, etc., with Sir Frederick Pollock's Introduction, in
which he says that the purpose of his book "is to show that there really is a Law of
Torts, not merely a number of rules of law about various torts-..."
Holmes concedes that, in light of recent cases, "[i]t would be bold, per-
haps, to say that the integration was complete ... '65 however, Holmes
saw a continuation of the trend as inevitable:6 6 "But I have no doubt that
the generalizing principle will prevail, as generalization so often prevails,
even in advance of evidence, because of the ease of mind and comfort
which it brings."
Unfortunately, Holmes does not go into detail in "Law in Science and
Science in Law" about what mechanisms produce integration. The only
clue is Holmes's reference to the "generalizing principle" and the "ease
and comfort of mind which it brings." 6 7 This suggests that what Holmes
has in mind is the law growing according to its own internal logic. Two
years earlier, in The Path of the Law, Holmes remarked on what he called
the "fallacy of logical form" in the law, by which he meant the tendency
of the law to develop along lines determined by its internal logic or struc-
ture: "The development of our law has gone on for nearly a thousand
years, like the development of a plant, each generation taking the inevita-
ble next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous
growth.' '68
Unlike some, 69 Holmes does not believe that relentless elaboration of
the logic of the existing legal system is the only factor at work in the law.
65 Id. at 451.
6 Id. Most contemporary scholars do not share Holmes's view that a general theory of
tort (as opposed to a series of theories for particular torts) is inevitable, see George C.
Christie, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts 7 (1983). However, economic theories of
tort law may eventually achieve the degree of generalization that Holmes predicted: see
Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970). See also
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L. J.
1055 (1972).
67 Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 55, at 468.
68 Id.
69 See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1978). See also Robert
H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 5 (1978) ("Law grows by
analogizing new situations to old . . . ").
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For Holmes, the generalizing principle, the logic of the law, is important,
but it is not sufficient.
70
C. Pathologies, or of Survivals and Generalizations
By the time he wrote "Law in Science and Science in Law," Holmes
had grown intolerant of the tendency in the law for generalizations to
persist and grow according to their own internal logic.7 ' The rest of "Law
in Science and Science in Law" is devoted to Holmes's inveighing against
the evils of "pure survival[s], having nothing or very little to back [them]
except that the practice is established; ' 72 "unreal formulas and inade-
quate generalizations; ' 73 "inadequate catch words . ..which, by their
very felicity, delay further analysis for fifty years;" 74 and "phrases
[which] have taken the place of real reasons." 75 He goes so far as to insist
that in the law "generalities are worse than useless ... ,,7' and that
"[a]ny solution in general terms seems to me to mark a want of analytic
power. "
77
The gravamen of Holmes's complaint against the tendency in the com-
mon law to construct generalizations is that legal formulas get in the way
of "scrutinizing the reasons for the rules which we follow .... 78 If law is
to fulfill its function to serve the ends of the governing power of the
community, 79 "the only way to solve the problem presented is to weigh
70 See Holmes, supra note 6, at 5: "It is something to show that the consistency of a
system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience" (emphasis added).
7 Two years earlier, in The Path of the Law, Holmes seemed more resigned to mankind's
affection for generalizations: "Most of the things we do, we do for no better reason than that
our fathers have done them or that our neighbors do them, and the same is true of a larger
part than we suspect of what we think. The reason is a good one, because our short life gives
us no time for a better, but it is not the best. It does not follow, because we all are compelled
to take on faith at second hand most of the rules on which we base our action and our
thought, that each of us may not try to . . . carry reason as far as it will go throughout the
whole domain. In regard to the law, it is true, no doubt, that an evolutionist will hesitate to
affirm universal validity for his social ideals. . . .Still it is true that a body of law is more
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely
to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are
ready to be stated in words." Holmes, supra note 55, at 468.
72 Holmes. supra note I, at 453.
73 Id. at 455.
74 Id.
15 Id. at 459.
76 Id. at 462.
77 Id.
71 Id. at 460.
71 See text at note 51 supra.
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the reasons for the particular right claimed and those for the competing
right . . . as well as one can, and to decide which set preponderates." 80
Immutable generalizations are impossible in the law because the environ-
ment is constantly changing, particularly in terms of the relative centrality
of social norms: 8 1 ". . . in the law we only occasionally can reach an
absolutely final and quantitative determination, because the worth of the
competing social ends which respectively solicit a judgment for the plain-
tiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to number and accurately fixed.
The worth, that is, the intensity of the competing desires, varies with the
varying ideals of the time, and, if the desires were constant, we could not
get beyond a relative decision that one was greater and one was less."
Holmes has come back to the paradox with which he began The Com-
mon Law: how logic and experience are woven together to shape the law.
Holmes goes on at some length to describe the institutional solutions that
the common law has developed to merge logic and experience so that the
law is ajoint product of the two. These include the jury, which introduces
large amounts of "popular prejudice" into its verdicts and thus tempers
the administration of the formal law with "the wishes and feelings of the
community;" ' 82 and more important, Holmes's own conception of the
proper judicial role, according to which judges are free to exercise
"the sovereign prerogative of choice" based on explicit consideration of
policy, at least in doubtful cases.8 3
Holmes's idea that judges may consider policy, controversial in its
time, 84 has since gained general acceptance. Today this part of Holmes's
argument seems true but tame. Let us go back, however, to reconsider
the significance of the evolutionary model of the legal process which
Holmes develops in "Law in Science and Science in Law."
II
Holmes apparently considered "Law in Science and Science in Law"
to be a significant essay. Rather than include it in the collection of his
occasional speeches to groups such as bar associations, Holmes pub-
lished it in the Harvard Law Review and preserved it in his Collected
8 Homes, supra note 1, at 462.
I' d. at 456.
82 Id. at 460.
8' Id. at 460-61. See also Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process
(1921).
84 See Harlan Fiske Stone, Introduction to Shriver, supra note 57, at xii: "We shall see
[Holmes] proclaiming in 1879 the heresy that within limits the judge is a legislator, as the
ultimate secret of the growth of the Common Law."
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Legal Papers.85 Another indication that Holmes considered "Law in Sci-
ence and Science in Law" substantial is that he sent the essay to his
friend Sir Frederick Pollock, the English legal scholar, shortly after it
appeared.86
However valuable Holmes may have thought the essay, scholars gener-
ally have virtually ignored it, concentrating instead on The Common Law
or Holmes's 1897 essay, "The Path of the Law,"-87 as the "masterpieces"
which express Holmes's views about the legal process.88 For example,
the late Grant Gilmore tells us: "After his appointment to the bench
Holmes never returned to the world of scholarship, so that the lectures in
The Common Law remain as his only attempt to formulate a coherent,
comprehensive statement of his theories about law." '89 Gilmore's state-
ment may be literally true, if one is willing to put enough stress on the
words "coherent" and "comprehensive," but it overlooks the fact that in
"Law in Science and Science in Law" Holmes returned to the ground
that he had covered eighteen years earlier in The Common Law.
Gilmore is not alone in overlooking "Law in Science and Science in
Law." Most who have written about Holmes's theories of law give it no
attention at all. On the few occasions when it has been cited, typically it
has been regarded solely as a work of legal history,' rather than as an
additional contribution in a series of pieces by Holmes about the com-
mon-law process and legal change.
From the vantage point of the history of ideas, "Law in Science and
Science in Law" presents two puzzles: why Holmes regarded this partic-
85 Holmes's editor and biographer, Mark DeWolfe Howe, reports that Holmes excluded
"Law in Science and Science in Law" from the volume of his occasional speeches and
included it in his Collected Legal Papers (1920) for the reason that it, "evidently seemed to
Holmes to be something more significant than [one of his] 'chance utterances of faith and
doubt,' . . ." Howe, Foreword to The Occasional Speeches of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes ix (1962).
86 Pollock wrote back politely, focusing on the roles ofjudge and jury, a peripheral point
that Holmes discusses near the end of the piece: "Your paper in Harv. L. Rev. is most
interesting. It suggests more questions than one can make up one's mind on off-hand. From
pp. 457-460 1 gather that you are oppressed by your statutory sharpenings of the line
between the functions of judge and jury. As law and practice here go, there is not and never
has been any hard rule either that juries are the judges of all questions of fact, or that they
are judges of nothing else." Letter from Pollock to Holmes, March 15, 1899, i Holmes-
Pollock Letters supra note 58, at 92.
87 Holmes, supra note 55.
88 See, for example, Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and
Legal Theory, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 673, 674, 692 (1982).
89 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 51.
90 See for example, Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Holmes: The Historian, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
712, 715 n.7, 716 n.9 (1931).
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ular speech as significant, and why generations of scholars have over-
looked it. 9 '
The text itself provides a clue as a starting point for understanding why
Holmes thought "Law in Science and Science in Law" was significant.
Holmes periodically invites his audience in the paper to compare his
views in 1899, after nearly two decades as a judge, with the views that he
had expressed as a young scholar in The Common Law.
"In a book which I printed a good many years ago I tried to establish.. .,;92
"I have called attention elsewhere to...";93
"I venture to think... now, as I thought twenty years ago, before I went upon the
bench, that ... 94
We can understand "Law in Science and Science in Law," then, as
Holmes's retrospective on The Common Law.
95
In many ways Holmes's ideas are unchanged, but on some points there
is a startling difference between Holmes the thirty-nine-year-old scholar
and Holmes the fifty-eight-year-old judge. Perhaps the most important
change is the depth of Holmes's confidence that judges can adapt the law
to a changing world. In The Common Law, Holmes assured his readers:
"[T]he law is administered by able and experienced men, who know too
much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism . . . .[W]hen ancient rules
maintain themselves . . .new reasons more fitted to the time have been
found for them .... .96 After sixteen years among these "able and
91 In part the answer to the second question may be stylistic. "Law in Science and
Science in Law" is a difficult essay, complicated by the esoterica of legal history and lacking
a clear organizing principle or theme, see supra text at note 16. But the same criticisms can
be made equally of Holmes's more famous works, including The Common Law, see Howe,
Introduction to Holmes, supra note 6, at xi. Stylistic difficulties alone cannot explain the
comparative obscurity of "Law in Science and Science in Law."
92 Holmes, supra note I, at 447.
93 Id. at 449.
14 Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
95 Holmes made numerous marginal notations in his copy of The Common Law: see "A
Note on the Text" in Holmes, supra note 6 at the unnumbered page following p. xxvii. In
some instances, Holmes's marginal notes on The Common Law closely parallel ideas he
expresses in "Law in Science and Science in Law." For example, on the first page of The
Common Law, where he discusses the role of history, Holmes wrote in the margin: "Imagi-
nation of men limited-can only think in terms of the language they have been taught.
Conservative instinct." Holmes, supra note 6, at 5, note a. Near the beginning of "'Law in
Science and Science in Law" Holmes states: " . . . continuity with the past is only a
necessity and not a duty. As soon as a legislature is able to imagine abolishing the require-
ment of a consideration for a simple contract, it is at perfect liberty to abolish it, if it thinks it
wise to do so, without the slightest regard to continuity with the past. That continuity simply
limits the possibilities of our imagination, and settles the terms in ii'hich ive shall be coin-
pelled to think." Holmes, supra note I, at 444 (emphasis added).
96 Holmes, supra note 6, at 32.
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experienced men," the Holmes of "Law in Science and Science in Law"
was less optimistic: "Judges commonly are elderly men, and are more
likely to hate at sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and
which disturbs repose of mind, than to fall in love with novelties. Every
living sentence which shows a mind at work for itself is to be wel-
comed."-
97
One need not probe too deeply into his experiences as a justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to discover the sources of
Holmes's discontent. In "Law in Science and Science in Law" Holmes
calls to our attention a case decided several months earlier by the Court,
Commonwealth v. Cleary,98 concerning "the grounds upon which evi-
dence of fresh complaint by a ravished woman is admitted as part of the
government's case in an indictment for rape. " 99 In an opinion by Holmes,
the court in Commonwealth v. Cleary denounced that practice as a "per-
verted survival of the ancient requirement that [the victim) should make
hue and cry as a preliminary to bringing her appeal." t00 Holmes's opinion
went on to note that "Lord Hale's statement of the law has survived as an
arbitrary rule .. . notwithstanding the later developed principles of evi-
dence . ... "'0'
Experiences such as these as a judge must have shaken Holmes's
confidence in the adaptability of the common law. To be sure, in Com-
monwealth v. Cleary Holmes led his fellow justices to abandon an ancient
common-law survival, albeit several hundred years after its original pur-
pose no longer applied and, according to Holmes, no valid new purpose
had grown up to support its retention.l°2 Homes did not always succeed,
however, in persuading his colleagues not to "sacrifice good sense to a
syllogism." Nor can it be said that Justice Holmes was always on the side
of "good sense" as opposed to arbitrary historical rules. 'n
Nonetheless, among the dissents in the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts in the late 1890s one does occasionally find Holmes, some-
times joined by one or two others, vainly attempting to persuade the
majority to modify traditional common-law rules in the light of "good
97 Holmes, supra note 1, at 455.
98 172 Mass. 175 (1898), cited in Holmes, supra note 1, at 453, n.J.
99 Holmes, supra note 1, at 453.
"o 172 Mass. 175, 176 (1898).
101 Id.
102 Compare Holmes, supra note 6, at 26 (assuming that if an ancient doctrine "were not
supported by an appearance of good sense, it would not have survived").
103 In Lewin v. Folsom, 171 Mass. 188 (1898), a unanimous court denied a claim for
compound, as opposed to simple, interest on a judgment. The only reason given in Justice
Holmes's opinion is the law's "ancient unwillingness to allow compound interest." 171
Mass. 188, 192 (1898).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
sense." An example is May v. Wood, 104 a case decided about six months
prior to' "Law in Science and Science in Law." Homes wrote a dissent
(the only dissent by any justice in the decisions from August 1898 to
March 1899). Margaret May, a domestic servant, sued, claiming the de-
fendants maliciously induced her employer to discharge her. The majority
dismissed her complaint for failure to plead false statements with
specificity, stating tartly: "There is, so far as we are aware, no form of
declaration for enticing masters away from servants. '115 Holmes in dis-
sent read the complaint not as "an action for slander with special dam-
ages, but [as] an action for malevolently and without justifiable cause
inducing a third person to break a contract."' 10 6 It was "plain," wrote
Holmes, "that the fact that the conduct of the possible customer in ab-
staining from dealing is lawful does not affect the liability of the person
",107who induced him to do so ....
In "Law in Science and Science in Law" Holmes does not specifically
mention his unsuccessful stand against rigid adherence to the traditional
forms of action in May v. Wood. Perhaps it would have been unseemly to
criticize a recent decision by his own court in which his views had not
prevailed. Instead Holmes attacks the English House of Lords opinions in
Allen v. Flood, 108 which he interprets as raising the same issues as his
dissent in May v. Wood: "[E]minent judges intimated that anything which
a man has a right to do he has a right to do whatever his motives." 09 For
Holmes, this kind of judicial reasoning stands as a lamentable example of
"over-generalization,""o of "the danger of reasoning from generaliza-
tions unless you have the particulars which they embrace in mind.""'..
"[I]f different rights are of different extent, if they stand on different
grounds of policy and have different histories, it does not follow that
because one right is absolute another is,-and if you simply say all rights
shall be so, that is only a pontifical or imperial way of forbidding discus-
sion."' 2 Holmes denounces legal reasoning based on abstract theories as
"worse than useless" and "a mark [of] a want of analytic power."" l 3
"o 172 Mass. 11 (1898).
105 Id. at 14.
'06 Id. at 15.
107 Id. at 14.
,08 [1898] A.C. !, cited in Holmes, supra note I, at 461.
109 Holmes, supra note 1, at 462.
"io Id. at 461.
I11 Id.
112 Id. at 462.
113 id.
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Holmes's harsh criticism of arbitrary survivals and of judicial over-
generalization in "Law in Science and Science in Law" is in sharp con-
trast to the rhapsodic view of the common law as changing with the times
with which he began The Common Law: "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the preva-
lent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determing the
rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation's development through many centuries ...." 114
These famous lines at the beginning of The Common Law aptly illus-
trate Holmes's own warning aginst the dangers of "phrases . ., which, by
their very felicity, delay further analysis for fifty years.', 5 Holmes's
ringing pronouncement that the life of the law is not logic but experience
has led some to believe that the common law was in fact highly responsive
to the felt necessities of the time.' 16 Even the Holmes of The Common
Law was not so naive or simplistic as to believe that the common law
always expressed perfectly the felt necessities of the time. Holmes's
statement is at least as much aspirational as descriptive." 7 Moreover, in
The Common Law Holmes as scholar and historian was concerned with
patterns of change that work themselves out in the common law over
hundreds of years, in Holmes's phrase: "the story of a nation's develop-
ment through many centuries ....18 It may be slim comfort to a judge
trying to do justice to litigants in cases such as Commonwealth v. Cleary
and May v. Wood that the common law may adapt to felt necessities after
another few centuries.
Between The Common Law and "Law in Science and Science in Law"
there is, at minimum, a shift in Holmes's sense of the relevant time
periods over which to evaluate the common law's adaptability. This shift
parallels Holmes's own change in perspective from common-law scholar
to judge. The survivals and over generalizations that Holmes denounces
vehemently in "Law in Science and Science in Law" had appeared to him
114 Holmes, supra note 6, at 5.
115 Holmes, supra note 1, at 455.
116 See for example, Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Ac-
tions: A Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 573, 576
(1981). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. Legal
Stud. 253 (1980).
117 "The felt necessities of the time . . . have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." Holmes, supra note
6, at 5 (emphasis supplied).
118 Id.
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as but temporary snags on the road of progress from the Olympian per-
spective of The Common Law."19
This change in perspective, however real, understates the full differ-
ence between the Holmes of The Common Law and the Holmes of "Law
in Science and Science in Law." Although Holmes's life of the law apho-
rism at the beginning of The Common Law should not be interpreted too
literally, there is nonetheless a subtle but important change in his view of
the relative roles of "logic"--deduction from the legal rules inherited
from history-and "experience"-judges' views of good sense-in shap-
ing the common law. When Holmes assays the relative roles of history
and judicial policymaking in The Common Law, he concludes that judicial
policymaking is the primary force shaping the substance of the law: "In
order to know what it [the common law] is, . . . [w]e must alternately
consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult
labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products
at every stage. The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be conve-
nient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depend very much upon its past" (emphasis
added). 120 In "Law in Science and Science in Law" Holmes the judge,
gives far more weight to the internal logic of the law, a force which is
independent of individual judges' ideas of what is "convenient."'
2'
Holmes's vision of the common law in The Common Law as reflecting
judicial judgments of "what is then understood to be convenient" leads
him naturally to describe the common-law judge as a kind of legislator:
[I]n substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than
that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is
legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most rarely men-
tion, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all
the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by litigation
is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of
public policy; ... 22
The Holmes of The Common Law advocates a more explicit recognition
and discussion of the legislative grounds which underlie the decisions of
judges. Holmes even suggests that the primary justification for his lec-
119 See Holmes, supra note 6, at 26.
120 Id. at 5.
121 See text at notes 160-61 infra.
122 Holmes, supra note 6, at 31-32.
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tures about common-law history is to prove his jurisprudential point that
judges, like legislators, act on considerations of policy.
123
This feature of Holmes's thought-assimilating, if not equating, judicial
and legislative functions-struck a particularly responsive chord for
twentieth-century legal scholars. James Landis has written that the image
of the judge "as a creative artist in the making of law" is what distin-
guishes nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories of law. 124 This view of
judges as creative artists or legislators who make law through individual
will and creativity has come to be associated with the legal realists of the
1920s and 1930s. 125 For laying the jurisprudential foundation for the realist
movement, Lon Fuller characterizes Holmes as "the most illustrious real-
ist of them all."'
126
The affinity that later scholars have felt for the image of the judge as
creative legislator which Holmes presents in The Common Law helps to
explain why "Law in Science and Science in Law" has largely been
ignored. As Grant Gilmore points out, Holmes has suffered the fate of all
who become heroic figures; his ideas have been used selectively by later
authors to advance their own causes: "The stalwarts of the post-
Holmesian orthodoxy took from the master only what suited them; the
disturbing and heretical aspects of his thought were ignored."' 27 On the
few occasions on which "Law in Science and Science in Law" has been
cited, what has captured notice have been the isolated passages that seem
to support the view that individual judges are, or should be, the creative
force that makes law.
128
I23 Id. at 32. See also id. at 64: "The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of
legislation, and the ease with which the law may be changed to meet the opinions and wishes
of the public, all make it natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others should openly
discuss the legislative principles upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and
should base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy to which the traditions of
the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty years ago."
124 James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays
214 (1934): "A chief point of departure between nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories
of law lies in the emphasis placed upon the judge as a creative artist in the making of law."
12' See, for example, Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930), esp. at 259: Karl
N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1962), esp. chs. 28 & 29
(discussing Holmes).
126 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 62 (1940). See also Touster, supra note 88, at
690: "What Holmes did was to set out a theory of the judicial process that recognized that
judges in deciding cases played a creative role in laying down the rules by which we are
governed."
127 Gilmore, supra note 12, at 67. For examples of movements in legal scholarship that
claim Holmes as intellectural ancestor, see George L. Priest. The Rise of Law and Econom-
ics, 33 J. Legal Ed. 437 (1983); Touster, supra note 88, at 674-80.
2 . In his bicentennial essay on American contributions to jurisprudence, H. L. A. Hart
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There is no question that the Holmes of "Law in Science and Science in
Law" still sees judges as exercising the "sovereign prerogative of
choice" when deciding a close case. 129 However, the legislative function
of judges, which played such a prominent role in The Common Law, is at
most a leitmotiv for Holmes in "Law in Science and Science in Law."
The view of the common law that Holmes wishes to defend in "Law in
Science and Science in Law" is not that judges make law as an act of
individual legislative or artistic creation. Rather, Holmes portrays the
common law as the product of a system with a logic of its own which
exists independent of any individual mind. The metaphor that Holmes
uses to describe the corporate mind of the legal system is evolution. 1
30
In "Law in Science and Science in Law," Holmes sees two different
processes of evolution at work simultaneously in the law, one based on an
analogy to Darwin's theory of natural selection 13' and the other based on
an analogy to Spencer's theory of integration. 32 In the Darwinian type of
legal evolution, competing "legal ideas" grow up and it is the task of
judges to say which of them is stronger in a particular case. When a
doubtful case, is presented, one with strong legal analogies on both sides,
judges are to determine which of the competing social desires-what we
might now call social policy goals-is "strongest at the point of con-
flict." 13 3 As decisions by individual judges accumulate, the sphere of in-
fluence of one legal principle expands, that of another contracts.
The image of the common law that Holmes presents in "Law in Science
and Science in Law" is not of judges legislating rules. The architecture of
the common law is not the product of conscious design choices by individ-
ual judges. It is rather the product of the logic of selection by a system, of
an "invisible hand" like that of the market, or of natural selection in
biology. This is not to say that Holmes's view is deterministic.
134
quotes Holmes in "Law in Science and Science in Law" for the proposition that in doubtful
cases judges "exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." H. L. A. Hart, Perspective of
Philosophy in American Law: The Third Century 417, 425 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976). See also a
review of Holmes's Collected Legal Papers by Morris Cohen which quotes Holmes's obser-
vation that judges "commonly are elderly men," Morris R. Cohen. 25 The New Republic
294 (1921), reprinted Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philoso-
phy 363, at 369 (1933).
'29 Holmes, supra note I, at 461.
'30 See text at notes 155-159 infra for a description of the similarity between Holmes's
concept of common-law evolution and "artificial intelligence."
131 See text at note 45, supra.
132 See text at notes 56-70, supra.
133 Holmes, supra note I, at 461.
' Although Holmes says the "strongest" legal idea prevails in competition, the
strongest is not necessarily the fittest in a normative sense, see Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman,
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Holmes's judges are free to decide, and whether they decide well does
matter. Holmes'sjudges are to weigh social policy, but not with the aim of
designing rules of law in the way that a legislator designs a statute.
Rather, Holmes assigns judges the more modest task of weighing social
policy for the limited purpose of saying that an existing legal rule should
not be followed because it reaches a less desirable result in a particular
case than an available alternative. The logic of selection is not construc-
tive, but subtractive.
The judge capable of performing the task imagined by Holmes in The
Common Law-to legislate wisely on all the subjects touched by the
common law-would indeed have to be a "Hercules," 135 not the narrow-
minded "elderly men" that Holmes confronted during his tenure on the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. The judge that Holmes imagines in "Law
in Science and Science in Law" does not have to be so wise that he can be
trusted to make law, at least not in the self-conscious way that an artist or
legislator creates something. Instead, he is faced with the less ambitious,
seemingly more manageable task of selecting against an existing legal rule
or principle if another, competing rule or principle reaches a less undesir-
able result in a particular case.1
36
The common law of the Holmes of "Law in Science and Science in
Law" uses the limited, local intelligence of judges to build a global intelli-
gence in the system as a whole. Thereby, the law may hope to be wiser
than the individuals who make it.
137
III
Holmes's image of the judicial role in "Law in Science and Science in
Law" seems refreshingly modest after decades of controversy about
supra note 41, at 15-17 (distinguishing between "cultural fitness," the probability of accep-
tance by others, and "Darwinian fitness," which increases adaptiveness to the environ-
ment). Holmes recognizes that factors such as linguistic similarities which have nothing to
do with adapting the law to the goals of the community may influence judges to prefer it,
Holmes, supra note 6, at 224-25 (misinterpretation of the Latin term causa helped to
establish a weaker form of consideration doctrine in assumpsit than in contract).
' Compare Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously: New Impression with a Reply to
Critics 105 (1978) (imagining an ideal judge for "hard cases" as Hercules, "a lawyer of
superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen"). But see James M. Landis, The Adminis-
trative Process 41 (1938) ("[M]ost government affairs are run by men of average capabilities,
and it is necessary to supply such men with a routine and ready-made technique...").
136 See also Herbert Simon's model of choice as "satisficing"-eliminating unsatisfactory
alternatives-rather than making the elaborate optimizing calculations posited for the classi-
cal economic decision maker, Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the
Environment, 63 Psychological Rev. 129-38 (1956), reprinted, Systems Thinking: Selected
Readings 214-30 (F. Emery ed. 1969).
137 See text at note 34 supra.
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judges' legislating. There is, however, a basic problem underlying
Holmes's description of the common-law process. Holmes portrays two
different kinds of evolution at work in the common law. This duality gives
Holmes's model much of its sophistication and power,' 38 but at the same
time it contains the seeds of its undoing. In many cases, Holmes's two
evolutionary processes pull in different directions. How is Holmes's
judge to decide which to follow? Holmes struggled with versions of this
problem throughout his career, never finding an entirely satisfactory an-
swer. At the end of this essay, I will suggest that Holmes's dilemma may
be insoluble within a common-law system.
To appreciate his dilemma, reconsider the dualistic evolutionary model
of the common-law process that Holmes presents in "Law in Science and
Science in Law." The first evolutionary process that Holmes describes is
the competition for survival among legal ideas, which is based on an
analogy to Darwinian natural selection.1 39 This evolutionary process re-
quires that judges base their decisions in close cases on the "social end
which the governing power of the community has made up its mind that it
wants." 140 What is important to notice about this kind of evolution is that
selection is in terms of a structure outside the system of laws: the commu-
nity's goals and values. Holmes's Darwinian type of evolution is, there-
fore, an example of what has been called "external selection," 141 selec-
tion based on consistency with the environment outside a system.
The second type of evolution that Holmes describes in "Law in Science
and Science in Law" is based on an analogy to Spencer's concept of
integration. 142 In this evolutionary process, judges decide according to
patterns that already exist inside the system of legal rules and principles.
When faced with a new problem, judges generalize from the body of
decided cases. 143 Thus, Holmes's second type of evolution is an example
138 See text at notes 155-59 infra.
139 See text at note 45 supra.
140 Holmes, supra note 1, at 452.
14' The distinction between internal and external selection is borrowed from social psy-
chologist Donald Campbell, supra note 33, at 32: "A distinction can be drawn between
internal selectors and external selectors. The selective criterion whereby random processes
form orderly crystals is the internal one of stable combinations among molecules. When
such combinations occur by chance they tend to stay put, while others continue to change,
thus leading to a biased accumulation of orderly arrangements. . . . But external selective
pressures enter the course of biological evolution, differentially modifying the reproductive
opportunity of different molecules of equivalent internal stability."
4' See text at notes 56-70, supra. See also J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: The Evolution
of a Sociologist 141-46 (1971) (comparing Darwin's and Spencer's theories of evolution).
' See Holmes, supra note 1, at 450-51 (describing generalizing tendency in the law of
torts). See also Dworkin, supra note 69 ("right answer" to legal questions determined by
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of "internal selection," selection based on consistency with the structure
that exists inside the system rather than in the environment outside it. 1
44
Internal selection is the kind of evolution that takes place in a closed
system, in which parts of the system are influenced primarily by other
parts of the same system; external selection is typical of open systems,
which are significantly influenced by the environment. 1
45
Some later writers who have used evolutionary metaphors conceive of
law as a closed system, which evolves (or, perhaps better, "grows")
according to Spencerian internal selection. 46 Others use evolutionary
metaphors to describe the legal process as an open system, which evolves
as a result of Darwinian external selection. 147 Holmes is unique in describ-
ing both internal and external selection as operating simultaneously to
shape the common law.
The two evolutionary processes that Holmes describes in "Law in
Science and Science in Law" are roughly comparable to the logic and
experience with which he opened The Common Law, but the focus has
best fit with body of cases and other legal materials); Bork, supra note 69 ("The law grows
by analogizing new situations to old.
144 See note 141 supra.
145 See generally Ludwig von Bertalanffy, The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and
Biology, I I I Science 23-29 (1950). Admittedly, there are cases in which what is "system"
and what is "environment" is not "a question with an obvious or trival answer." Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications, xxi
(rev. ed. 1968).
46 See Robert Clark, The Morphogenesis of Sub-chapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 Yale L. J. 90 (1977). Clark describes the evolution within a "corporate
tax culture" with "comparatively clear boundaries" Id. at 91 as a process in which a "few
basic decisions" work themselves out in a "cumulative, evolutionary way" toward "ever-
increasing complexity and specificity." Id. at 92. See also Dworkin, supra note 69; Bork,
supra note 69.
147 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65
(1977). Rubin and Priest are part of the tradition that views law as an open system that grows
and changes in response to the social environment, see also Harry H. Wellington, The
Nature of Judicial Review, 91 Yale L. J. 486 (1982); Henry M. Hart, Jr., & Albert Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (tent. ed. 1958)
(unpublished teaching materials): Frederick Charles von Savigny, The Vocation of our Age
for Legislation and Jurisprudence (A. Hayward trans. 1831) (law as expression of
Volksgeist). The distinctive feature of Rubin and Priest's evolutionary theories of the com-
mon law is the 'hypothesis that settlement decisions by litigants are the source of the selec-
tion which shapes the law. Rubin and Priest interpret their theories as explaining why the
common law would,tend toward economic efficiency. The emphasis on efficiency is based
on the assumption that other features of the social environment that might affect the litiga-
tion-settlement ratio are random, see Priest, supra, at 67-68. If that assumption is incorrect,
and there are any values in addition to wealth that systematically affect settlement decisions,
then by parity of reasoning, those values should also be reflected in the law. For example,
the American Civil Liberties Union might influence the law by systematically relitigating
issues which are contrary to its view of the First Amendment.
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shifted from individual judge to legal system. Acting alone, no judge
makes law; law is a function of legal systems, in which judges communi-
cate and are influenced by one another. 48 The interesting issue is not why
an individual judge decides as he does, but why others follow. Internal
and external selection take place at the level of patterns of decisions
within a legal system. When other judges follow a decision because it is
consistent with the structure of ideas that already exists within the law-
with legal logic-internal selection is at work. When instead a decision is
followed because it is in harmony with patterns in the environment out-
side the legal system-with the felt necessities of the time and culture-
then external selection is at work.
What occupies most of Holmes's attention in "Law in Science and
Science in Law" is a struggle to define the proper relationship between
these two different evolutionary processes. Gone are the confident asser-
tions of the Holmes of The Common Law that experience, not logic, is the
life of the law. 149 Instead, as Holmes surveys the history of the common
law in "Law in Science and Science in Law," everywhere he looks
Holmes sees survivals, by which the past "govern[s] the present in spite
of ourselves,"' 50 and "unreal formulas and inadequate generalizations"
which "dodge difficulty and responsibility with a rhetorical phrase."''
What bothers Holmes in "Law in Science and Science in Law" is the
prospect that legalistic logic may choke off experience and the ability of
the common law to adapt. 1
52
By the time that he wrote "Law in Science and Science in Law,"
Holmes saw that ideally the common law's logic and experience should
not be antagonistic, but complementary. Today's logic of the common
law embodies yesterday's experience. 153 When common-law judges
search for a solution compatible with the community's goals and values,
they are guided by existing legal doctrines which represent, to a degree at
least, the community's ideals as distilled from past experience. On the
other hand, if the law is to remain alive, experience must act as a continu-
4 See Paul D. Carrington, Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. Legal Stud.
303, 3!3 (1979). See also Deutsch, supra note 37; Martin Shapiro, Decentralized Decision-
Making in the Law of Torts, in Political Decision-Making 44, 44-45 (Sidney Ulmer ed. 1970).
149 See text at notes 114-21, supra.
'5o Holmes, supra note 1, at 452.
'' Id. at 455-56.
152 Holmes does not delve into why internal selection tends to dominate, except to blame
the law schools for "teaching dogma," id. at 460.
'5' This is the import of Holmes's statement that the common law is a "great anthropolog-
ical document" which we can study "to discover what ideals of society have been strong
enough to reach that final form of expression." Id. at 444.
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ing check on yesterday's logic, adapting it when it is out of phase with the
community's values or has become outdated.
15 4
The relationship which Holmes posits between internal and external
selection-the common law's logic and experience-takes his description
of the common-law process in "Law in Science and Science in Law"
beyond a simple analogy to biological evolution. Rather, by describing a
two-part evolutionary structure in which internal and external selection
are linked together, Holmes was groping toward theories of cybernetic
feedback and "organizational intelligence" which were only invented two
generations later. 1
55
Holmes's common law is a system of artificial intelligence as surely as
any computer program. 156 The key feature that gives the common law the
ability to learn about the environment is cybernetic feedback: legal logic
generates first approximations, which have a better than random chance
of being tolerable to the community because they are based on analogies
to solutions accepted in the past; external experience then operates to
modify those results which the community cannot accept, thereby trans-
forming the law for the future.' 57 In much the same way, an artificial
154 The relationship between "logic" and "experience" outlined in the text is an instance
of the general process by which organizations adapt internal selection systems which are
proxies for external selection by the environment, see Campbell, supra note 33 at 33:
"Another type of internal selection criterion occurs when processes of evolution build in
internal selective criteria which are vicarious representatives of external selectors. Thus the
nutritiousness of foods represents an external criterion of direct survival relevance. It is
represented in us by approximately appropriate internal selective criteria of taste buds and
associated pleasure and pain mechanisms . . . . The adaptive appropriateness of these
vicarious criteria are to past ecologies, and if the environment has markedly changed, the
vicarious selective system may operate in ways irrelevant to current adaptiveness." See
also Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in
Administrative Organization 100-101 (3d ed. 1976).
155 See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decisionmak-
ing Through Mutual Adjustment (1965); Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government:
Models of Political Communication and Control (1963). See also Alfonso Shimbel, Collec-
tive Intelligence, 20 General Sys.: Y.B. Soc. General Sys. Research 205 (1975). The applica-
tion of theories of organizational intelligence to law is still in its infancy, see Shapiro, supra
note 148; Shapiro, supra note 40; Martin Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-
Making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis? 2 Law in Transition Q. 134 (1965).
156 See generally Artificial Intelligence: An Introductory Course (A. Bundy ed. 1978).
There have been several attempts in recent years to apply the artificial intelligence literature
to legal scholarship, Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation about
Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 40 (1970); L. Thorne McCarty,
Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 837 (1977). Unlike prior work, which attempts to use artificial intelligence
principles to simulate the reasoning process of an individual lawyer, the text of the present
article is meant to suggest that a more productive use of artificial intelligence concepts can
be made in understanding the operation of legal systems.
117 Compare Arthur Linton Corbin, Principles of Law and Their Evolution, 64 Yale L. J.
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intelligence program learns about the environment, uses that information
to guide searches, and then uses the results of those searches to improve
its internal model of the environment. 158 Had Holmes cared less for the
felicity of a phrase, he could have written: "The life of the law is the
cybernetic process by which experience modifies the available logic set."
What makes it possible for a system to learn about the environment is
the relationship between internal and external selection. For the common
law to adapt to a changing environment, external selection must be able to
correct the results generated by the internal selection system. 159 Here is
where Holmes's account of the common law runs into trouble. At least in
the works of his middle age, such as "Law in Science and Science in
Law" Holmes is unwilling to subordinate legal logic to judicial views of
what experience teaches. For the Holmes of "Law in Science and Sci-
ence in Law," the common-law judge is not a legislator. The legislature is
"at perfect liberty to abolish" the requirement of consideration for a
contract "if it thinks it wise to do so.''"" The judge is not. Holmes
maintains in "Law in Science and Science in Law" that judges must
follow established doctrine, even if it appears outdated or unwise:
I do not think it desirable that the judges should undertake to renovate the law.
That is not their province .... But I think that it is most important to remember
whenever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on one side and other
161, 162 (1954) ("although no two cases are ever exactly alike .... by careful and imagina-
tive analysis and comparison . . . it is possible to construct general rules, doctrines, princi-
ples, which are of great value in directing and predicting future human and judicial action...
[as] tentative working rules ..... ) with Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and
the Sense of the Profession, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123, 141-42 (1962) (describing law as a
"continuing process" in which judges collectively "back and fill, zig and zag, groping...
for a line of thought which will in the end satisfy their standards of craft and their vision of
the policy of the community . .. "). See also Bruce A. Ackerman. The Structure of
Subchapter C: An Anthropological Comment, 87 Yale L. J. 436, 444-45 (1977) (suggesting a
similar process of first borrowing "existing tools" and then "adaptation" in the evolution of
statutes).
15' See Marvin Minsky, Steps toward Artificial Intelligence in Computers and Thought
407, 425-26 (Edward A. Feigenbaum & Julian Feldman eds. 1963). See also Allen Newell.
Artificial Intelligence and the Concept of Mind in Computer Models of Thought and Lan-
guage (Roger C. Schank & Kenneth Mark Colby eds. 1973). It has been argued that human
beings use analogous rules of thumb in making certain decisions, see Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124
(1974).
159 Herbert Simon has called the necessary relationship between internal and external
selection "nested hierarchy," and identifies this structure as characteristic of both evolution
and learning, Herbert A. Simon. The Architecture of Complexity, 106 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc.
467 (1962), reprinted in Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 84, 94-98 (1969).
See also B. F. Skinner, Selection by Consequences. 213 Science 501 (1981).
"6 Holmes, supra note 1, at 444.
HOLMES AND EVOLUTION
analogies on the other, that what really is before us is a conflict between two social
desires .... The social question is which desire is strongest at the point of conflict.
The judicial one may be narrower, because one or the other desire may have been
expressed in previous decisions to such an extent that logic requires us to assume
it preponderate in the one before us. [Emphasis added.]' 6 '
It would not solve Holmes's problem to return to The Common Law
and the judge as legislator. Judges must be willing to follow established
legal doctrine if the system is to be wiser than the individuals who consti-
tute it. 162 On the other hand, the law cannot adapt unless judges are also
free to modify logic in the light of experience. Thus, Holmes faces a true
dilemma. Judges have inconsistent roles in a common-law system. They
must bring to bear the accumulated wisdom of the past; however, they
must also serve as the portals through which "experience" enters the law
so that it can keep pace with a changing world.1
63
It is not necessarily impossible for judges to perform both functions,
but Holmes cannot give an explanation that is compatible with the rest of
his theory for when judges are to follow logic and when experience.64 The
best he can do is to suggest that judges may disregard precedent if they
can find very good historical reasons for doing so.165 On the other hand,
no special effort is required to enforce a "survival."1
66
161 Id. at 460-61.
162 Text at notes 134-35, supra. Paul Carrington has made much the same point: "A legal
system that is not able to assure the accountability of officials for their fidelity to law is one
that allows little opportunity for truly effective judicial lawmaking .... When every judge
seeks in every case to emulate the creative career of Learned Hand there can be no Learned
Hands, because little that any of them write can be expected to control the behavior and
decisions of other judges in the future who claim equal wisdom and equal right to the
creative role." Paul D. Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure,
60 A.B.A.J. 860. 862 (1980).
16' It is not self-evident that the common law should change with the times in all areas, see
Epstein. supra note 116. Compare Holmes, supra note 1, at 460("... because I believe that
the claim to our especial code to respect is simply that it exists, that it is the one to which we
have become accustomed . .. I am slow to consent to overruling a precedent ...").
'" To reject established law, one needs a "criterion" by which to measure "judicial
mistake," see Wellington, supra note 147, at 514. This is a difficult concept, if not a con-
tradiction in terms, for a positivist who believes, with Holmes, that law is
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and nothing more pretentious .
Holmes, supra note 55, at 461.
165 Holmes, supra note I, at 452, 454.
66 If other things were equal, the comparative ease of enforcing survivals could be
expected to bias the law toward rigidity, compare Jerry L. Mashaw, How Much of What
Quality? A Comment on Conscientious Procedural Design, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 823, 833-34
(1980) (availability of appeal to correct errors in one direction but not the other tends to
"skew" results).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
IV
Since Holmes wrote "Law in Science and Science in Law," the com-
mon law has gradually been supplanted in many areas by more complex
lawmaking systems in which courts, agencies, and legislatures make law
jointly. Unlike the common law, these composite lawmaking systems are
characterized by elaborate hierarchies of institutional roles (reflected in
bodies of "meta-law" such as principles of statutory construction and
administrative law). The multiple levels of internal and external selection
in a composite lawmaking system give it the capability, in theory, to store
more information about the environment and to engage in more subtle
forms of exploratory behavior.
No single reason adequately explains a change in lawmaking institu-
tions of this magnitude. Perhaps its significance can at least be symbolized
by juxtaposing Holmes's 1880 pronouncement, "the life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience," 16 7 with James Landis's from 1934: the
common law "feeds too much upon itself." 168
167 Holmes, supra note 6, at 5.
168 Landis, supra note 124, at 213.
